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INTRODUCTION 
urricanes, floods, and earthquakes are recent natural disasters to 
have hit the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Compounding these 
natural disasters is one that is man-made: the Puerto Rican debt crisis. 
Current estimates are that Puerto Rico owes more than $73 billion to its 
bondholders.1 How did this happen?  
This Comment is an examination of the legislation designed to help 
Puerto Rico restructure its finances and reorganize and/or discharge its 
debt. The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability 
Act (PROMESA) passed June 2016 because neither Puerto Rico nor 
any of its municipalities, as merely a territory of the United States, have 
access to the U.S. bankruptcy system. This Comment will (1) consider 
the island’s legal history and how its territorial status helped bring 
Puerto Rico into the current debt crisis, (2) compare PROMESA to 
what would have been available through the U.S. bankruptcy system in 
Chapter 9, (3) explore the constitutional repercussions stemming from 
the lack of Puerto Rican representation to the Board, (4) examine the 
financial options under consideration at the time of this Comment, and 
(5) consider what other options Puerto Rico should have in addition to
PROMESA through an examination of the debt restructuring processes
of Detroit, Michigan, and Greece.
I 
HISTORY OF PUERTO RICO’S LEGAL STATUS AND FINANCIAL 
SITUATION 
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”2 
Since its founding, Puerto Rico has struggled with governance. As a 
colonial island, Puerto Rico had little autonomy in the financial, social, 
or governmental decisions that dictated its behavior.3 For a majority of 
Puerto Rico’s existence, it was a possession of the Spanish government. 
1 Matt Egan, Who Owns Puerto Rico’s Mountain of Debt? You Do, CNN (Oct. 9, 2017, 
9:46 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/27/investing/puerto-rico-debt-who-owns-trump/ 
index.html.  
2 Attributed to George Santayana. See Caleb Flamm, George Santayana (1863–1952), 
https://www.iep.utm.edu/santayan/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2018).  
3 FRANCESCO CORDASCO, THE PUERTO RICANS: 1493–1973: A CHRONOLOGY & FACT 
BOOK (Francesco Cordasco & Eugene Bucchioni eds., 1973). 
H 
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The governors, primarily military or political appointees, had almost 
complete control over all decisions on the island.4  
As late as 1898, Puerto Rico had deep ties with Spain.5 The strongest 
of those ties were military and economic.6 The Spanish used the large, 
safe port of San Juan as a base to launch offensive and defensive 
attacks.7 Following the American and French revolutions, what little 
self-governing autonomy Puerto Rico had was stripped from it due to 
Spain’s fear of rebellion from its remaining territories.8 Following the 
Spanish-American War, the 1899 ratification of the Treaty of Paris 
gave the United States full political control of the island,9 after which 
Puerto Rico operated in a quasi-political state that was generally 
controlled by a United States political appointee.10 These appointees 
were unfamiliar with large-scale governance, generally did not speak 
Spanish, and did not have much interest in running the country or 
engaging with the local political culture.  
Puerto Rico operated as a possession of the United States; some local 
governance was accepted, but most decisions came from Washington, 
D.C., by way of the governor. Puerto Rico did not have a
Congressionally approved constitution until after the passage of Public
Law 600 in 1952.11 Public Law 600 authorized the people to “organize
a government pursuant to a constitution of their own adoption.”12 The
constitution that was ratified was “overwhelming[ly] approv[ed]” by
the people and modeled after the U.S. Constitution.13
The current political status of the island is one that is semi-
sovereign. The Governor and state representatives are democratically 
elected with moderate autonomy over local matters, such as 
implementing local taxes and running elections.14 However, there are 
still many drawbacks. The single elected Puerto Rican representative 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 19.  
6 Id. 
7 Id.  
8 Id. at 79. 
9 Id. at 6.  
10 See id. at 82–84. 
11 R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RES. SERV., RL32933, POLITICAL STATUS OF PUERTO 
RICO: OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 9–10 (2011). 
12 Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81–600 § 1, 64 Stat. 319 
(1952).  
13 Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1866 (2016). 
14 GARRETT, supra note 11, at 9.  
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to the House of Representatives cannot vote, Puerto Ricans cannot vote 
in federal elections, nor were any of the plenary powers of Congress 
ceded to Puerto Rico. Matters of citizenship status, federal taxation, 
federal laws, and the like are still within the control of Congress.15  
There have been legal struggles for Puerto Rico. In decisions 
referred to collectively as the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court has 
notably regarded Puerto Rico as a possession of the United States.16 As 
such, Puerto Rico does not fully enjoy the same rights and privileges 
as the states.17 This arrangement has some advantages for Puerto Rico, 
including having access to the financial markets of the United States, 
access to the dollar, access to federal aid programs such as Social 
Security, and having military protections.18 The drawbacks to this 
arrangement are, as we see today, quite serious. 
A. Island Finances: Past
Historically, Puerto Rican society was agrarian and very poor. The 
main cash crops were sugar, coffee, and tobacco.19 Due to its distance 
from the mainland of either of the island’s colonizers, Puerto Rico did 
not receive the financial benefit of being a colony until nearly the end 
of the 1800s when fresh capital and lowered tariffs revitalized the sugar 
industry.20 From the early 1890s to the late 1930s, Puerto Rico changed 
significantly. 
More than a quarter of Puerto Rico’s total wealth, and substantially 
more of its productive wealth, was owned by foreigners, total 
national income increased over the period . . . [however], there is 
little evidence to suggest that the average income figures meant 
improvements in the standard of living of the mass of working and 
nonworking people, and economically, politically, and culturally, the 
forces of U.S. capitalism weighed ever so heavily on . . . Puerto 
Ric[o].21  
The World War II era was difficult for the island. Puerto Rico relied 
upon ships for export of products and import of needed food supplies, 
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 12. 
17 For a full history of the Insular Cases, see JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1985).  
18 See CORDASCO, supra note 3, at 82.  
19 Id. at 5; JAMES DIETZ, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF PUERTO RICO 26 (1987). 
20 DIETZ, supra note 19, at 61. 
21 Id. at 133.  
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and those ships were routinely attacked by the Germans.22 The threat 
of starvation increased because the “Farmers’ Association . . . would 
never accept the suggestion of conversion from cane to food” because 
it would cut into their profit margins too heavily.23 Food shortages were 
common during this time, and prices on imported food rose an average 
of 90 percent.24 Agricultural firms’ reluctance to switch production 
from sugar cane to food to save its workers from starvation, coupled 
with the weakness of the sugar industry, shifted political emphasis 
“toward what was thought to be the most efficient way to increase 
economic growth and employment rapidly at the least cost to the 
government.”25 The government decided the most efficient way to 
increase economic growth would be to shift Puerto Rico’s economy 
from agriculture to industrialization post–World War II with the 
implementation of Operation Bootstrap in the late 1940s. Operation 
Bootstrap, as it was called because the Puerto Ricans were attempting 
to “lift [themselves] up by [their] own bootstraps,”26 was a combination 
of incentives for manufacturers and foreign investors. Most of the 
offered incentives were based on tax exemptions. “On May 13, 1948, 
the legislature approved Act No. 184 granting full local tax 
exemption—income, property, excise, and municipal taxes—to new 
industries for a period of ten years, with an additional three years of 
partial exemption.”27 Combining Act No. 184 with the Jones-Shafroth 
Act’s (Jones Act) federal tax advantages (discussed later in this 
section), Puerto Rico’s fiscal policies were designed to attract large 
corporations in order to change the underlying structure of the 
economy.  
B. Island Finances: Present
Puerto Rico receives revenue from external and internal sources. 
The external revenue sources originate from the United States federal 
22 Id. at 202. 
23 Id. at 202 (front for the sugar producers and roughly corresponding to that better-
known American phenomenon, the California Farmers’ Association). 
24 Id. at 203.  
25 Id. at 207. 
26 A.W. MALDONADO, TEODORO MOSCOSO AND PUERTO RICO’S OPERATION 
BOOTSTRAP 69 (1987). 
27 Id. at 57–58. 
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government.28 Puerto Rico receives federal funding similar to the 
funding received by all states within the United States for various 
initiatives. Those funds are allocated to needs such as road maintenance 
and federal programs.29 Internal revenue sources come from three 
different principle streams. First, the general revenue fund is composed 
of tax revenue.30 Second, the special fund is composed of “earmarked 
taxes, proceedings from general obligation bonds, or transfers from the 
General [Revenue] Fund.”31 The third principle stream is the revenue 
from public enterprises. 
Declining revenue returns, both internal and external, are attributed 
to several reasons. First, financial problems from some of the state-run 
enterprises created holes that bonds were offered to fill. Second, 
privatization of some of the state-run enterprises, like the telephone 
company, reduced the revenues received.32 Third, as the policies of the 
federal government shifted, the funding received through some of the 
programs that residents took part in, such as food stamps and other 
“War on Poverty” and “New Federalism” programs,33 also changed. 
Puerto Rico has no recourse to address the wide fluctuations of federal 
funds because Puerto Rico’s government is dependent upon the current 
administration’s political agenda. 
What is a bond and why are the bonds important to Puerto Rico? 
Bonds are fixed income investments.34 Normally, a government entity 
issues a bond to fund a project or activity. Bonds are not dependent 
upon market price; a bond is set at a fixed, contractual interest rate35 to 
be paid over the life of the bond, called a maturity date, rather than its 
value fluctuating based on market price. For investors, bonds make an 
attractive base for an investment portfolio, as the return is meant to be 
stable. The issuance of bonds is important to Puerto Rico because it 
allows the government to finance large projects, such as the state-run 
power company.36 Puerto Rico also issues bonds to cover large deficits 
28 James Alm, Assessing Puerto Rico’s Fiscal Policies, in THE ECONOMY OF PUERTO 
RICO: RESTORING GROWTH 319, 324 (Susan M. Collins et al. eds., 2006). 
29 Id. at 325.  
30 Id. at 324.  
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 326. 
33 Id. at 327. 
34 Bond, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bond.asp (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2018). 
35 Id. 
36 DIETZ, supra note 19, at 207. 
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in the budget that the local tax base is unable to fill.37 How is Puerto 
Rico able to issue bonds that are so attractive to investors? 
In 1917, Congress passed the Jones-Shafroth Act (Jones Act or Act). 
The Jones Act granted a number of rights to the citizens of the island; 
the Act made it so that only U.S. ships are able to enter the ports of 
Puerto Rico and, most importantly for our purposes, exempted Puerto 
Rican bonds from federal, state, and local taxes.38 This so called “triple 
tax exempt[ion]”39 allows a bondholder to receive the interest payments 
without paying taxes on that interest regardless of the location of the 
bondholder. The states were not able, and are still not able, to take 
advantage of this bond exemption. The sections of the Act regarding 
ship entry and the tax exemption for bonds are still in effect.  
The financial incentives, for both investors and Puerto Rico, were 
too much to resist.40 Puerto Rico’s triple tax-exempt bonds enabled 
investors to have a solid base for their portfolios; investors readily 
purchased many of the bonds at issuance. Capitalizing on the investors’ 
enthusiasm, Puerto Rico issued the bonds and collected the funds. After 
collection, Puerto Rico funded projects the government wanted. 
The island issued bond after bond, refinancing old debt with new 
debt.41 Refinancing the debt and using the bonds to finance needed 
public works made the Puerto Rican government “reliant on the 
issuance of debt.”42 The island’s eroding tax base prevents the bond-
funded projects from sufficiently amortizing the debt.43 As of 2002, the 
general revenue fund increasingly relies more heavily on individual 
(39.3 percent) and corporate income taxes (36.6 percent).44 However, 
with corporations leaving after tax exemptions expire, and residents 
leaving to seek better employment opportunity on the mainland, the tax 
base does not reflect the current reality of where tax policies need to be 
in order to properly amortize the debt. 
37 Id.  
38 Jones-Shafroth Act, Pub. L. No. 64–368 § 3, 39 Stat. 951 (1917).  
39 DIETZ, supra note 19, at 207. 
40 Francesca Trianni & Ellie Ismaildou, The Next Financial Catastrophe You Haven’t 
Heard About Yet: Puerto Rico, TIME (Mar. 12, 2014), http://time.com/20416/the-next-
financial-catastrophe-you-havent-heard-about-yet-puerto-rico/.  
41 Id. 
42 Milton Vescovacci, The Demise of Puerto Rico Is in Part Attributed to U.S. 
Congressional Action, BLOOMBERG LAW (June 23, 2016), https://www.bna.com/demise-
puerto-rico-n57982074653/. 
43 Alm, supra note 28, at 328. 
44 Id.  
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Adding more fuel to the bond fire, Section 936 of the Internal 
Revenue Code was codified in 1976 as a tax incentive for 
corporations.45 Those incentives included a business deduction—100 
percent tax deduction of dividends paid to a parent company by a 
subsidiary if more than 80 percent is owned by a foreign entity.46 An 
example of this ownership structure would be if foreign Corporation A 
owned 85 percent of the stock for Subsidiary B. Sub B had a profitable 
year and paid a dividend to its shareholders. Corporation A would be 
able to deduct 100 percent of the dividend it received from Sub B. For 
tax purposes in Puerto Rico, corporations owned within the United 
States were considered “foreign.”47 This setup allowed for dividends to 
be paid to the parent company tax free. This made for an excellent way 
to move dividends from company to company without having to pay 
taxes as the parent company received the funds.  
Puerto Rico, still suffering from the financial hardships of the early 
half of the century and from the downturn in the export of sugar and 
tobacco,48 looked for a way to lure industry and foreign corporations. 
Puerto Rico decided to use a property tax incentive to help convince 
corporations to move their businesses to the island. This property tax 
incentive would allow deferment of the property taxes for a set number 
of years before payments would begin. Thus, foreign corporate 
investment in Puerto Rico was very lucrative given the Section 936 tax 
incentives coupled with the property tax payment delays and ignited 
the territory’s industrial boom.  
So, what happened? With the growing commercial sector, Puerto 
Rico finally looked to be headed toward financial solvency—until the 
tax reform efforts launched in 1996. There was a sharp decline in 
manufacturing jobs after the repeal of Section 936 in 1996.49 Section 
936 was phased out over a ten-year period.50 After the repeal, to give 
Puerto Rico and its investors time to adjust to the new tax realities, the 
45 Gavin Elkins & Scott Greenberg, Tax Policy Helped Create Puerto Rico’s Fiscal 




48 CORDASCO, supra note 3, at 154.  
49 Puerto Rico in Crisis Timeline, CTR. FOR PUERTO RICAN STUDIES, 4 (2017), 
https://centropr.hunter.cuny.edu/sites/default/files/PDF_Publications/Puerto-Rico-Crisis-
Timeline-2017.pdf. 
50 DAVID BRUMBAUGH, CONG. RES. SERV., RS20695, THE PUERTO RICAN ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY TAX CREDIT: CURRENT PROPOSALS AND SCHEDULED PHASEOUT (2000). 
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island’s financial managers continued to issue bonds and investors 
continued to buy them, despite the island’s near insolvency.51 The 
island was almost insolvent because  
following the elimination of the tax incentives in 1996, the gross 
domestic product in Puerto Rico went from approximately 10% in 
2000 to approximately -3.5% (that’s right, negative 3.5%) in 2006 
and then thereafter it has hovered at less than 0% GDP. Hundreds of 
jobs were lost as Puerto Rican subsidiaries of mainland corporations 
closed down and moved their operations to Mexico and other 
Caribbean countries.52  
Puerto Rico, in an unsuccessful attempt to offset some of the tax 
damages, attempted to pass its own tax reform.53 The last of the tax 
breaks was phased out in 2006, a mere two years before the Great 
Recession hit the United States and many people suffered from the 
financial crisis. Things went from bad to worse after that; tax revenue 
continued to fall after Puerto Rico’s population migrated to the 
mainland in search of work.54  
C. Bankruptcy Efforts
In a fiscal crisis many individuals, including city government 
officials, turn to the federal government for assistance. That help exists 
in the form of bankruptcy relief. Puerto Rico is not eligible for 
bankruptcy relief due to a Congressional provision that defines “state” 
as excluding the municipalities of the island.55 This definition allows 
for only the municipalities located in states within the United States to 
take advantage of the privileges of statehood. Due to the denial of the 
privilege of a federal bankruptcy, Puerto Rico attempted to pass its own 
bankruptcy code in June 2014, the Puerto Rican Corporation Debt and 
Recovery Act (Recovery Act).56  
The Recovery Act was an attempt by Puerto Rico to convince its 
creditors to negotiate the debt down and restructure the payments.57 
The Recovery Act mirrored the Federal Bankruptcy Code. The 
51 MALDONADO, supra note 26, at 57–58.  
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 Heather Long, Puerto Rico’s Crisis: How Did It Get So Bad?, CNN (May 12, 2016), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/12/investing/puerto-rico-debt-crisis/index.html. 
55 MALDONADO, supra note 26.  
56 Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1943 (2016). 
57 Id. 
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Recovery Act provided a court-supervised restructuring to help provide 
the most recovery available for the broadest group of creditors.58 Those 
creditors still had to vote to approve the plan.59  
Two of the largest creditors, Franklin California Tax-Free Trust and 
BlueMountain Capital Management, LLC, brought suit alleging Puerto 
Rico did not have the authority to enact their own version of 
bankruptcy.60 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether or not the 1984 amendment to the Federal Bankruptcy Code 
definition of “state” removed Puerto Rico from the preemption 
provision.61 The Court found Puerto Rico was not a “state” for purposes 
of being a debtor under bankruptcy provisions and could not avail itself 
of bankruptcy protections. However, Puerto Rico is still subject to 
preemption provisions as a “state.”62 What does it mean to be subject 
to preemption provisions? Preemption means that within the realm of 
federal jurisdiction, federal law will overcome local laws. This left 
Puerto Rico with no other option but to petition Congress for 
assistance.  
Puerto Rico has a state-but-not-a-state problem as it is subject to 
federal laws as a territory but is without the privileges of statehood. 
This problem left Puerto Rico trying to pay its debts, but the 
government defaulted on a $35.9 million payment in early 2014, and 
more than $2 billion in payments were due by July 1 of the same year.63 
In response to the default to the debt, Congress passed the Puerto 
Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act 
(PROMESA) in June of 2016.64 Puerto Rico’s troubles worsened 
because of a massive hurricane. In early September 2017, Hurricane 
Irma swept past the island causing 30-foot waves, 100+ mph winds, 
deaths by lightning strikes, and power outages.65 Then came Hurricane 






63 Puerto Rico in Crisis Timeline, supra note 49, at 5. 
64 Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), Pub. 
L. No. 114–187, 130 Stat. 549 (2016) [hereinafter PROMESA].
65 John P. Cangialosi et al., Hurricane Irma—Tropical Cyclone Report, NAT’L 
HURRICANE CTR. (June 30, 2018), https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL112017_ 
Irma.pdf. 
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a Category 4 storm at landfall.66 Maria wiped out much of the 
infrastructure and left great devastation in its wake after landfall on 
September 20, 2017. Six months after landfall, many residents of 
Puerto Rico were still without power or potable water, and people were 
leaving the island at a faster rate than before.67 Conservatively, the 
damage done to Puerto Rico is estimated to range from $30 billion to 
$95 billion in repairs and loss of economic output.68 
II 
PROMESA 
“A Promise made is a debt unpaid.”69 
Promesa means “promise” in Spanish.70 The irony of the translation 
may or may not be lost on a Congress that ended the tax benefits that 
aided Puerto Rico. However, PROMESA may be the only lifeline 
thrown to Puerto Rico from the United States government in the current 
political cycle. PROMESA is legislation that is designed for Puerto 
Rico based on the Federal Bankruptcy Code (the Code). This section 
of the Comment will detail the differences and similarities between 
PROMESA and Chapter 9 of the Code and discuss the changes and 
provisions of PROMESA that will likely have the most impact. 
A. Chapter 9 Provisions
In 1934, Congress enacted what is currently known as Chapter 9 in 
the Code.71 Chapter 9 allows municipalities that need financial 
66 Richard J. Pasch et al., Hurricane Maria—Tropical Cyclone Report, NAT’L 
HURRICANE CTR. (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL152017_ 
Maria.pdf. 
67 Alexia Fernández Campbell, 5 Things to Know About Puerto Rico 100 Days After 
Hurricane Maria, VOX (Dec. 29, 2017, 7:18 PM), https://www.vox.com/2017/12/23/ 
16795342 /puerto-rico-maria-christmas.  
68 Jill Disis, Hurricane Maria Could Be a $95 Billion Storm for Puerto Rico, CNN 
MONEY (Sept. 28, 2017, 3:04 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/28/news/ 
economy/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-damage-estimate/ index.html. 
69 Attributed to Robert W. Service, BRAINYQUOTE, https://www.brainyquote.com/ 
quotes/robert_w_service_187117?src=t_debt (last visited July 18, 2018). 
70 Promesa, Spanish to English Dictionary, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://es.oxford 
dictionaries.com/translate/spanish-english/promesa (last visited July 18, 2018). 
71 Chapter 9—Bankruptcy Basics, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-9-bankruptcy-basics (last visited 
July 18, 2018). 
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restructuring to file bankruptcy in Federal Bankruptcy Court.72 The 
Code defines a municipality as a “political subdivision or public agency 
or instrumentality of a State.”73 Chapter 9, with some modifications, 
acts similarly to a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy claim. An 
automatic stay is put in place to protect the debtor’s assets while 
additionally prohibiting a mandamus action against an officer of the 
municipality.74 An automatic stay is an immediate injunction that 
prohibits the collection of debts against the debtor for the entirety of 
the process of bankruptcy. The automatic stay also provides protection 
for creditors because it puts all the creditors on an even playing field: 
all actions against the debtor’s assets need court approval no matter the 
secured status of the creditor.  
Additionally, under the automatic stay in Chapter 9, payments to 
bondholders can be paid without violating the stay.75 This provision is 
to ensure the special revenues being collected and guarantee the debt 
can be paid to the bondholders.76  
The Court plays a limited role in the reorganization of the 
municipality debtor. 
Section 904 limits the powers of the bankruptcy courts to ‘interfere 
with (1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor; 
(2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or (3) the debtor’s
use or enjoyment of any income-producing property’ unless the
debtor consents or the plan so provides.77
An appointed United States Trustee will appoint a creditors committee, 
but there will not be an examination of the debtor; no move for an 
appointment of a trustee is allowed, nor a conversion of the case, nor 
supervision of the administration of the case by the trustee.78 Creditors 
will not be allowed to propose competing plans, and if certain 
requirements are met, the debtor’s proposed plan is binding on the 
dissenting creditors.79  
“Neither creditors nor the court may control the affairs of a 
municipality indirectly through the mechanism of proposing a plan of 
72 Id. 
73 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2016). 
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adjustment of the municipality’s debts that would in effect determine 
the municipality’s future tax and spending decisions.”80 Additionally, 
bondholders are treated differently dependent upon the type of the 
bond.81 If the bond is a general obligation bond, the debt is treated as 
general debt and the municipality is not obligated to pay interest during 
the course of the case.82 If the bond is a special revenue bond, interest 
on that bond will be paid if revenue is available.83  
B. Comparing PROMESA to Chapter 9
This Section is a comparison between the provisions in PROMESA 
and the provisions in a Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. This section 
will discuss six differences between the two types of legislation. The 
first difference between PROMESA and a Chapter 9 bankruptcy is the 
establishment of the Oversight Board (the Board). The Board consists 
of seven voting members appointed by Congress and the President and 
one nonvoting member, the Governor.84 The Board has broad authority 
to enact reforms and enforce implemented austerity measures.85 The 
Board implements these plans to “ensure accountability in the territory 
and its institutions.”86 The Board’s sweeping powers include the ability 
to prevent various acts of the local government including “legislative 
acts, executive orders, regulations, rules, and contracts,” or any other 
function that might hinder the growth of the economy under the 
Board’s direction.87 The composition of the Board will be discussed in 
further detail in Part 3.  
The second difference between PROMESA and a Chapter 9 
bankruptcy is the debtor’s autonomy and plenary powers. In a Chapter 
9 bankruptcy, a municipality retains the authority to propose a debt 
adjustment plan without creditor affirmation.88 However, PROMESA 
does not allow the Governor nor the Legislature to propose a plan or 
modify a plan without the approval of the Board.89 Additionally, 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1943 (2016). 
83 Id. 
84 PROMESA, supra note 64, at § 101(e)(1)(A), 130 Stat. 549 (2016). 
85 DIETZ, supra note 19, at 3.  
86 Id. at 4.  
87 Id. at 26.  
88 Chapter 9—Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 71. 
89 PROMESA, supra note 64, § 104(j)(1), 130 Stat. 549 (2016). 
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PROMESA does not allow for any actions by the Puerto Rican 
government to “issue debt or guarantee, exchange, modify, repurchase, 
redeem, or enter into similar transactions with respect to its debt” for 
the entire time the Board is in operation.90 Puerto Rico will need to have 
access to capital markets so that in the future it will be able to finance 
projects again. PROMESA is designed so that the Board structures the 
financial affairs in a way that is fiscally responsible for years to come.91 
The third difference is that fiscal responsibility measures are 
implemented via “recommendations” by the Board. 92 The Governor or 
the Legislature (whichever is applicable) is required to submit plans for 
implementation of the recommendations. If the recommendations are 
not adopted, the governing body submits a “statement of rejection of 
the recommendations, and the Governor or the Legislature shall submit 
such statement of explanations to the President and Congress.”93 This 
last requirement, in this author’s opinion, is extreme and feels akin to 
public shaming.  
The fourth difference is that Puerto Rico has little choice but to 
follow the recommendations of the Board at this time. Little to no 
outside assistance from the federal government for repayment of the 
debt is allowed. Section 210 of PROMESA specifically states that 
“[t]he full faith and credit of the United States is not pledged for the 
payment of any principal of or interest on any bond, note, or other 
obligations issued by a covered territory or covered territorial 
instrumentality.”94 Congress found that without these measures, the 
government of Puerto Rico would be unable to “obtain capital markets 
in the future.”95 
The fifth difference between PROMESA and a Chapter 9 
bankruptcy is the automatic stay. In a Chapter 9 bankruptcy, the 
automatic stay is in place for the entirety of the plan. There are special 
provisions to prevent creditors from attempting to use the inhabitants 
of the municipality as leverage to pay the debts and from orders of 
90 Id. at § 207.  
91 DIETZ, supra note 19, at 12. 
92 PROMESA, supra note 64, § 205(a). 
93 Id. at § 205(b)(3). 
94 Id. at § 210(a). 
95 Examining Challenges in Puerto Rico’s Recovery and the Role of the Financial 
Oversight and Management Board: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 
115th Cong. 7 (2017) (testimony of Natalie Jaresko) [hereinafter H. Comm. on Natural 
Resources]. 
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mandamus forcing payment on a debt.96 In PROMESA, the automatic 
stay had an expiration date built in—February 15, 2017, or six months 
after the Board was established.97 There are provisions for extensions, 
as needed and dependent solely upon Board approval, while the plan is 
being approved.98 Congress found the limited life of the stay 
“advance[d] the best interests common to all stakeholders” and that to 
ensure “all creditors have a fair opportunity to consensually renegotiate 
terms of repayment based on accurate financial information that is 
reviewed by an independent authority. . . .”99  
PROMESA requires the Board to file annual reports describing the 
government’s progress and adherence to the recommended austerity 
measures.100 These reports must also include descriptions of:  
• “progress made by the territorial government in meeting the
objectives of this Act during the fiscal year;”
• any “assistance provided by the [Board] to the territorial
government;”
• “recommendations to the President and Congress on changes to
this Act or other Federal laws;
• other actions of the Federal Government, that would assist the
territorial government in complying with any certified Fiscal
Plan;” and
• a report which details the “precise manner in which funds
allocated to the [Board] . . . have been spent.”101
This is very different from how Trustees and other agents in a 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy behave. As of now, no requirements exist for a 
Trustee or an authorized person to submit reports to Congress and the 
President.  
The sixth and final difference between PROMESA and a Chapter 9 
bankruptcy discussed in this section is the comparison of the actions of 
the Trustee and the dissolution of the Board. In a Chapter 9 bankruptcy, 
the Trustee has a limited role; there is no oversight of the debtor’s 
96 Id. 
97 PROMESA, supra note 64, § 405(d)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at § 405(m)(5)(A)-(B).  
100 Id. at § 208(a)(1). 
101 Id. at § 208(a)(2)-(4).  
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finances, the Trustee does not supervise the administration of the case, 
nor does the Trustee have authority to move for an appointment of an 
examiner or a conversion.102 Compare those rather diminished 
capacities of the Trustee in a Chapter 9 bankruptcy to the broad, 
powerful obligations and privileges of the Board discussed above. 
Once the Board has deemed to have completed its task, the Board is 
terminated by certification by itself that the following conditions have 
been met: one, the “applicable territorial government has adequate 
access to short-term and long-term capital credit markets at reasonable 
interest rates to meet the borrowing needs of . . . government;” and two, 
the government has developed its budgets for at least four consecutive 
fiscal years, and during the year of termination the expenditures did not 
exceed the revenues.103  
III 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE UNELECTED 
OVERSIGHT BOARD 
The Oversight Board has broad powers granted to it by Congress. 
The powers granted to the Board are not checked by the traditional 
checks and balances found in other sections of the government. The 
unelected Board has political freedom to recommend harsh changes to 
make Puerto Rico more fiscally responsible. This Section discusses the 
constitutional ramifications of the Board and its unelected members.  
The Board members are appointed and approved by Congress and 
the President.104 These appointees come from a wide variety of 
backgrounds. There is a former bankruptcy judge,105 a CEO of a New 
York bank, a former Government Development Bank (GDB) leader, a 
scholar who served during the Bush administration, and a former 
budget director from California.106 The Executive Director of the 
Board, Natalie Jaresko, receives a salary of $625,000. This total salary 
does not include the additional security, lodging reimbursement, and 
102 Chapter 9—Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 71.  
103 PROMESA, supra note 64, at § 210(a). 
104 Id. at § 101(e)(2)(A). 
105 Arthur J. González, PROMESA CODEX, http://www.promesacodex.com/arthur-j-
gonzaacutelez.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2018). 
106 Ed Morales, The Technocratic Takeover, JACOBIN MAGAZINE (Sept. 13, 2016), 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/09/puerto-rico-promesa-board-obama-trump/. 
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chauffer she receives while serving in her post.107 Ms. Jaresko was also 
the Mister of Finance for Ukraine.108 This salary differs dramatically 
from the $275,000 paid to the executive director of the Detroit 
Bankruptcy.109 The salary difference is significant in both amount and 
in what it represents: the idea that despite the debt, Congress does not 
value Puerto Rico. It could be argued that the position warrants high 
compensation due to the responsibilities involved. Despite this 
argument, this author feels Congress merely gives lip service to the 
austerity measures. PROMESA does not allow any branch of the Puerto 
Rican government to review the Board’s actions or spending of the 
Board’s $2 million per month budget. Current democratic societies 
expect governmental accountability, open government, and fiscal 
responsibility. Understanding these expectations, it is not a surprise 
that the Puerto Rican people are displeased with the lack of input 
regarding how the money in the Board’s large yearly budget is spent.110 
Recently, creditors have brought constitutional challenges against 
the Board. For example, Aurelius Capital filed suit in August 2017 
alleging, among other things, that the Appointments Clause of the 
United States Constitution is being violated.111 The Appointments 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires the appointment of principle 
officers of the government by the President with the advice and consent 
of Congress.112 Aurelius Capital contends that the Board members are 
principle officers of the United States and thus need appointment by 
the President and the advice and consent of Congress.113 According to 
Aurelis Capital, the Board’s failure to go through this process violates 
the Appointments Clause and is unconstitutional.114  
107 Detroit Paid Less for the Manager of Their Board, NOTICEL (Mar. 31, 2017), 
http://www.noticel.com/ahora/detroit-paid-less-for-the-manager-of-their-board/ 
609226381. 
108 H. Comm. on Natural Resources, supra note 93. 
109 Id. 
110 PUERTO RICO SYLLABUS, https://puertoricosyllabus.com/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2018). 
111 U.S. CONST., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Mary Williams Walsh, Hedge Fund Sues to 
Have Puerto Rico Bankruptcy Case Thrown Out, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/08/07/business/dealbook/puerto-rico-debt-oversight-board.html. 
112 See generally Matthew Hunter, Legislating Around the Appointments Clause, 
91 B.U. L. REV. 753 (2011). 
113 See Walsh, supra note 111. 
114 Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Creditor Aurelius Asks U.S. Judge to Throw Out 
Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debt-
bankruptcy/puerto-rico-creditor-aurelius-asks-u-s-judge-to-throw-out-bankruptcy-
idUSKBN1EZ2UR. 
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The Board responded to this claim by arguing that Puerto Rico is a 
territory, not a state, so there is no violation of the Appointments 
Clause115 since Congress retains sole discretionary powers over 
territories.116 Congress is merely extending the President’s authority to 
the creation of this Board with its limited function and purpose.117  
Additionally, the Board argued that PROMESA did not require the 
President to seek the advice and consent of Congress. Instead, 
PROMESA merely suggested a list of potential candidates. This 
suggestion is not mandatory, so the Board’s action does not violate the 
Appointments Clause.118 
IV 
THE DEBT: WHAT CAN BE DONE 
Alexander Hamilton once said, “A national debt, if it is not excessive 
will be to us a national blessing.”119 Currently the debt load of Puerto 
Rico is far from a national blessing. Puerto Rico’s debt is massive, 
calculated as more than $73,000,000,000 as of March 2018.120 Puerto 
Rico will drown under its own weight if the promise of PROMESA 
falls short. This section will explore when the spending spree started, 
where the money went, who owns the debt, and what the options for 
Puerto Rico are in conjunction with the Board.  
A. Bond Spending Spree
The spending spree began when Puerto Rico needed a huge influx 
of capital. There was a need for investment in infrastructure, business, 
electricity, and education. The bonds issued by the local government 
were snatched up by investors eager to reap the benefits of the tax-free 
interest payments. The money collected from the sale of the bonds 
went, in t, to the establishment of the electrical control grid. The Puerto 
115 Memorandum in Support of the Constitutionality of PROMESA at 1, In Re: The 
Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, No. 17–1929 (D.P.R. Dec. 6, 
2017). 
116 Id. at 2–3.  
117 Id.  
118 Id.  
119 See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris (Apr. 30, 1781), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-02-02-1167. This quotation goes on 
to explain that taxes, without being excessive, are a spur to industry and can be used to 
cement the union. 
120 Mary Williams Walsh, How Puerto Rico Is Grappling With a Debt Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/business/dealbook/ 
puerto-rico-debt-bankruptcy.html. 
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Rican Electric Power Authority (PREPA) is the state-owned and 
operated electric grid. PREPA has filed for relief under Title III, the 
debt restructuring provision of PROMESA.121 Some bonds were issued 
to help promote a system of universal health care.122 Others were issued 
to cover deficits in the budget.123  
After 2006, Puerto Rico was still searching for a way to repay its 
debts, so the territory began to issue new bonds to meet its financial 
needs.124 The Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA) 
issued bonds based on special sales tax revenues to help guarantee the 
debt in a way that it had not been previously.125 The so-called sales and 
use tax (SUT) was passed by the local government to benefit the central 
government at a rate of 5.5 percent and the municipalities were to 
receive 1.5 percent.126 Those rates increased to 11.5 percent in 2015.127 
COFINA bonds are general obligation bonds. The payments on the 
general obligation bonds are constitutionally required to be paid ahead 
of almost every other government debt,128 which helps create greater 
demand for the bonds. However, the funding needed to pay the interest 
on these general obligation bonds is lacking, leading Puerto Rico to 
default on payments.  
B. Who Owns the Debt?
Bond ownership is difficult to trace precisely because many bonds 
are purchased en masse in a market that allows for anonymity. Puerto 
Rico only further complicates matters for bondholders’ identification 
because the Government Development Bank (GDB) is reluctant to 
disclose bondholders’ names and information without a court order.129 
121 Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”) Title III, No. 17–04780 (D.P.R. 
filed July 2, 2017), http://dm.epiq11.com/#/case/PR1/info.  
122 Walsh, supra note 120. 
123 Mary Williams Walsh, The Bonds That Broke Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/business/dealbook/the-bonds-that-broke-
puerto-rico.html?mcubz=0&_r=1. 
124 Investor Resources: Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corp. (COFINA), GOV’T DEV. 
BANK OF PUERTO RICO, http://www.bgfpr.com/investors_resources/ cofina.html (last 




128 P.R. Const., Art. IV, § 2.  
129 Joel Cintrón Arbasetti et al., Who Owns Puerto Rico’s Debt Exactly? We Tracked 
Down 10 of the Biggest Venture Firms, IN THESE TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017), 
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As of June 2018, no order for the identity of the bondholders has been 
issued. Recent data tracked by Bloomberg shows that close to $14 
billion of the total is owned by mutual fund companies within the 
United States.130 Another $1 billion is reportedly owned by a single 
wealthy investor named Seth Klarman.131 It is speculative but likely 
that so-called vulture firms make up the rest of the majority of the 
owners of the bonds.132 A vulture firm is an investment firm that “[i]n 
times of crisis . . . swoop[s] in to buy the cheapest, most troubled assets, 
giving desperate sellers an opportunity to exit. The investors get a 
chance to profit—from other peoples’ disasters.”133 The remaining 
portion of the debt is the ever-increasing interest.134  
C. Options for the Board
Congress, in the House Committee report, was determined to right 
the financial wrongs perpetuated by past administrations, while still 
leaving the debt as the island’s burden.135 This Congressional intent to 
saddle the island with the debt is further evidenced by the PROMESA 
clause that states the United States government will not back Puerto 
Rican debt.136 Section 210 is explicit:  
(a) IN GENERAL.—The full faith and credit of the United States is
not pledged for the payment of any principal of or interest on any
bond, note, or other obligation issued by a covered territory or
covered territorial instrumentality. The United States is not
responsible or liable for the payment of any principal of or interest
on any bond, note, or other obligation issued by a covered territory
or covered territorial instrumentality. (b) SUBJECT TO
APPROPRIATIONS.—Any claim to which the United States is
http://inthesetimes.com/features/puerto_rico_debt_bond_holders_vulture_funds_named.ht
ml.  
130 Nancy Moran & Martin Z Braun, Here Are the Top-Eight Holders of Puerto Rican 
Debt, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 4, 2017, 2:11 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2017-10-04/here-are-the-top-eight-holders-of-puerto-rican-debt.  
131 David Dayen, We Can Finally Track One of the Largest Holders of Puerto Rican 
Debt, THE INTERCEPT (Oct. 3, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/10/03/we-can-finally-
identify-one-of-the-largest-holders-of-puerto-rican-debt/.  
132 Venture Capitalist, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/vulture 
capitalist.asp (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).  
133 Katherine Burton & Katia Porzecanski, Vulture Investing, BLOOMBERG (May 31, 
2017, 8:25 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/vulture-investing. 
134 Tim Worstall, The Truly Horrible and Ghastly Mess Of Puerto Rico’s Bond Issuance, 
FORBES (May 6, 2017, 9:11 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2017/05/06/ 
the-truly-horrible-and-ghastly-mess-of-puerto-ricos-bond-issuance/#37cbccd44224.  
135 See generally H. Comm. on Natural Resources, supra note 95. 
136 PROMESA, supra note 64, at § 210. 
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determined to be liable under this Act shall be subject to 
appropriations. (c) FUNDING.—No Federal funds shall be 
authorized by this Act for the payment of any liability of the territory 
or territorial instrumentality.137 
This leaves the Board to make its recommendations to the Governor 
or the Legislature. So far, the Board has recommended government 
employee and teacher furloughs, a renegotiation of healthcare costs, 
and a reduction in professional services contracts.138 As of June 2018, 
the Board is not considering any other solutions. 
Unfortunately, Puerto Rico’s insurmountable debt is not its only 
fiscal problem. Currently, the Board’s analysis of the proposed budget 
for Fiscal Year 2018 shows an estimated loss of about “$800 million of 
Affordable Care Act funding for [Puerto Rico’s] healthcare system.”139 
Additionally, there are problems with revenue collection after 
Hurricane Maria.140 Moreover, businesses have been shut down or 
delayed in reopening, infrastructure is missing, and power is still out in 
some areas.141 
V 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN 
Society enriches itself through the exploration of culture. Culture 
comes in many forms: art, music, museums, and exploring nature. 
Local governments make difficult choices when facing a budget 
crunch. Basic needs—roads, schools, electricity, water, etc.—have to 
be weighed against those things that make society richer. Does selling 
a public park to a developer for tax revenue help or hurt the citizens? 
Will keeping an art museum that generates low revenue help or hurt the 
local populace? Is there something special about the area that can 
attract tourists? What choices have been made by others that can be 
copied to help Puerto Rico?  
Puerto Rico, Detroit, and Greece all have one thing in common—
financial crises. The financial crisis that has embroiled Puerto Rico is 
not an unusual one. Puerto Rico is unique given its amount of debt and 
137 Id. 
138 Puerto Rico Oversight Board Recommends Emergency Fiscal Measures, REUTERS 
(Mar. 9, 2017, 1:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/puertorico-debt-board/puerto-
rico-oversight-board-recommends-emergency-fiscal-measures-idUSL2N1GM287. 
139 Id.  
140 H. Comm. on Natural Resources, supra note 95, at 3–4. 
141 Id. 
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its struggle to alleviate this burden. Despite Puerto Rico’s current 
singular option for recovery through PROMESA, there are some 
outside entities that have had similar experiences that may provide 
guidance for the Board and Puerto Rico. Detroit is an example of a 
recent U.S. municipality bankruptcy. Greece is an example of an entity 
that has semi-sovereign status within the European Union. Puerto Rico 
can use a combination of the examples provided by Detroit and Greece 
as a possible solution to the financial crisis it is currently experiencing. 
A. Detroit and the Public Good
Detroit, Michigan, was the center of auto manufacturing in the 
United States during the automobile boom starting after World War 
II.142 With cheaper overseas labor costs, a downturn in car purchases,
and a decline in overall manufacturing, Detroit lost people, lost
revenue, and gained debts. With mounting costs from unfunded
pensions and healthcare,143 Detroit filed for Chapter 9 protection in
2013.144 Selling assets to help settle debts is a typical solution in
bankruptcy. Under this approach, Detroit considered selling one of its
larger assets—the Detroit Institute of Arts (DIA) with an appraisal
value of $4.6 billion.145 With the city facing upwards of $18 billion in
debt, the thought of selling even one of the works of art in the museum
was tempting. Eventually, Detroit was able to keep the museum, public
pressure notwithstanding, with the help of public and private
funding.146 The so-called Grand Bargain pulled in private funding from
philanthropic foundations such as the Knight Foundation, the Ford
Foundation, and the Mott Foundation. These major players would help
release the DIA from the city’s grasp, shield the art forever, and help
142 Thomas J. Sugrue, From Motor City to Moto Metropolis: How the Automobile 
Industry Reshaped Urban America, AUTO. IN AM. LIFE AND SOC’Y, 
http://www.autolife.umd.umich.edu/Race/R_Overview/R_Overview3.htm (last visited July 
20, 2018). 
143 Detroit “Clearly Insolvent,” Says Emergency Manager, BBC (May 13, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-22514588. 




145 Randy Kennedy, “Grand Bargain” Saves Detroit Institute of Arts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
7, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/arts/design/grand-bargain-saves-the-detroit 
-institute-of-arts.html.
146 Id.
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Detroit pay down some debt.147 Detroit came out of bankruptcy sixteen 
months later with its cultural treasures, implementing a new plan to pay 
its debts, and hoping for a more financially solvent future.  
B. Greece and the International Monetary Fund
Despite being part of the European Union, Greece has struggled 
financially in recent years.  
Since 2008, Greece has suffered the effects of the global financial 
crisis. As one of the weakest economies of the European Union, 
Greece is among the countries which have been affected the most. In 
2010, the prime minister at that time, George Papandreou, signed the 
first “memorandum of understanding” with the Troika, which 
consists of the European Union (EU), the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB). Since then the 
country’s debt has increased from 120 per cent of GDP to 180 per 
cent of GDP, and Greece has undergone a grueling experience 
resulting from the necessity of taking austerity measures to be able to 
repay its debt and restore itself to an economic footing acceptable to 
its creditors.148  
In addition to the agreed-upon austerity measures, Greece had 
another route to recovery—bailout loans. Greece was able to borrow 
funds from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to assist in its 
recovery. The IMF, established in 1944 in response to the Great 
Depression, is an international economic group.149 The IMF’s primary 
purpose is three-pronged: surveillance, loans, and capacity 
development.150 Under the surveillance prong, the IMF monitors 189 
member countries’ economic and financial policies.151 The IMF 
monitors policies and advises a policy change if there is something that 
could be detrimental to the worldwide economy. The lending prong 
allows the IMF to loan funds to member countries in economic 
downturns.152 Under the final prong, capacity development, the IMF 
147 Nathan Bomey et al., How Detroit Was Reborn, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Jan. 22, 
2015), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/09/detroit-
bankruptcy-rosen-orr-snyder/18724267/. 
148 Abdellatif Darwish, Greece and Its Financial Crisis, AL JAZEERA CTR. FOR 
STUDIES, 2 (Aug. 16, 2015, 11:44 AM), http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/08/ 
20158169112264868.html. 
149 About the IMF, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/en/About (last visited 
July 20, 2018). 
150 See generally id. 
151 See generally id. 
152 See generally id. 
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assists member countries through “technical assistance and training—
[to help] member countries design and implement economic policies 
that foster stability and growth by strengthening their institutional 
capacity and skills.”153  
Member countries can borrow from the IMF via lines of credit, 
liquidity lines, and differential loans based on the immediacy of 
financial need.154 A borrower must receive full consensus of the lending 
executive board to borrow a loan or line of credit.155 
IMF lending aims to give countries breathing room to implement 
adjustment policies in an orderly manner, which will restore 
conditions for a stable economy and sustainable growth. These 
policies will vary depending upon the country’s circumstances. For 
instance, a country facing a sudden drop in the prices of key exports 
may need financial assistance while implementing measures to 
strengthen the economy and widen its export base. A country 
suffering from severe capital outflows may need to address the 
problems that led to the loss of investor confidence—perhaps interest 
rates are too low; the budget deficit and debt stock are growing too 
fast; or the banking system is inefficient or poorly regulated.156 
C. Puerto Rico’s Options Outside of PROMESA
Puerto Rico is not a member of the IMF. However, the United States 
is a member country of the IMF. As an option for Puerto Rico to get to 
full financial recovery, the United States could borrow funds from the 
IMF and allow Puerto Rico access to them. To do so, Section 210 of 
PROMESA must be amended to allow for the full faith and credit of 
the U.S. government to back the loan from the IMF. If Congress still 
wanted Puerto Rico to be accountable for its finances, Puerto Rico 
could be required to pay back the IMF. In order to facilitate the 
repayment of the debt (while maintaining the credit of the United 
States), the federal government could make the payments on Puerto 
Rico’s behalf. Repayment from Puerto Rico could be made via 
withholding from pre-authorized payments. To make sure one 
particular section of federal funding was not singled out, Congress 
could authorize percentages to be withheld from each area of the 
153 See generally id. 
154 Lending by the IMF, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/ 
external/about/lending.htm (last visited July 20, 2018). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
2018] What Happens When an Island Starts to Drown Under 329 
Its Own Weight? The Debt Crisis of Puerto Rico 
budget. Additionally, as long as Puerto Rico is part of the United States, 
the Constitution does not allow for debts not to be repaid.157  
Another option for Puerto Rico is debt cancellation. This is not a 
new proposition. The United States used the Doctrine of Odious Debt 
for the cancellation of the debts of the former Spanish colonies of 
Puerto Rico and Cuba after the Spanish-American War in 1898.158 The 
premise of the Doctrine is that the debt obtained for purposes contrary 
to the general populations should be eliminated.159 The United States 
suggested the Doctrine again after the invasion of Iraq by the Bush 
Administration in 2004.160 This doctrine of debt cancellation is not 
universally accepted because of fears of abuse by powerful nations.161 
Despite the fears of abuse, other factors, such as upgrades to aging or 
inferior infrastructure, still lead to increased debt for many countries.  
Some groups in Germany and Africa at G8 Summits are championing 
debt cancellation as a means by which countries in similar financial 
difficulties as Puerto Rico can move forward. Even if the doctrine of 
illegitimate or odious debt is broadly accepted, and even if a 
substantial portion of debt is cancelled, developing countries will 
continue to require means of financing their development projects. In 
other words, canceling debt today does not eliminate the need to take 
out new loans tomorrow if a country wants to make forward progress. 
Anticipating that exploitation and corruption cannot be totally 
eliminated, [some groups] have asserted that what is required is a way 
of adjudicating questions of debt in such a way that countries can 
demonstrate that debts attributed to them should be considered 
illegitimate, creditors can argue that contracts should be enforced, 
and destitute nations can reduce their debt burdens when they prove 
too onerous to be repaid without unjustly penalizing the country’s 
people. These proposals, referred to as the Fair and Transparent 
Arbitration Mechanism (“FTAP”), would make it possible, for 
instance, for a country to effectively declare bankruptcy, see a portion 
of its debts forgiven, and be restored to creditworthy status, just as is 
157 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4 (“The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation 
of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.”). 
158 Soren Ambrose, Social Movements and the Politics of Debt Cancellation, 6. CHI. J. 
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done for bankrupt individuals or companies, or even local 
governments, in industrialized countries like the US.162  
There have been some recent suggestions from the current 
administration that some of the debt will need to be forgiven.163 This 
has angered many and relieved others. Aside from the contractual 
obligations of the bonds themselves, debt forgiveness for some bonds 
but not others leads to questions of fairness. From a pure financial 
perspective, the highest-cost debt should be forgiven first—the 
pensions. The pensions are not well funded, have no definitive end in 
sight, and cost the most. Rationally, that would be the first debt 
removed from the payment equation. However, societal costs of not 
paying pensions are incalculably high. Americans, starting around the 
New Deal era, have decided that retirement and pensions are important. 
The system was not perfect, but it rewarded grit and steadfastness. It 
was good for our economy and our culture.164 
CONCLUSION 
Puerto Rico’s financial ills leave many lessons for international 
communities. Bonds, specifically public projects finance bonds, must 
be centered on revenue streams that do not depend on an investment 
return from a small population.  
For the island to be revenue dependent, the tax policies must be 
updated cohesively while satisfying the island’s realistic goals and 
budgetary needs. The possible tax changes that would be beneficial are 
the following: tax policy reform/revision of government-owned money 
collection efforts, debt forgiveness or cancellation, and a revision of 
PROMESA to reflect the Puerto Rican government’s need to obtain 
outside help.  
First, the tax structure of the island, combined with renewed and 
updated collection methods of funds owed, should be changed to reflect 
162 Id. at 282–83. 
163 Lucinda Shen, President Trump’s Puerto Rican Debt Comments Have Spooked 
Investors, FORTUNE (Oct. 5, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/10/04/puerto-rico-donald-
trump-debt-bankruptcy/. 
164 Public pensions are a tradition for a reason; they made the American dream possible 
for generations. As they spread across the country from the 1930s through the 1960s, seniors 
who had worked all their lives were freed from the desperation and poverty that awaited 
those in earlier decades. More seniors could safely retire, and young workers were 
incentivized to work hard and accept demanding jobs, knowing they would be compensated 
for their efforts and commitment in retirement. See Andrew Collier, America’s Public 
Pensions Matter, THE HILL (Sept. 8, 2018), http://thehill.com/opinion/finance/384874-
americas-public-pensions-matter. 
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the current reality of the mobility of technology. With software making 
businesses less reliant upon physical location, adjustment to fiscal 
policies that are forward-looking will help to close the gaps for tax 
evasion and collection. Second, the tax base should be expanded. Doing 
so will allow the municipalities to rely more heavily on indirect 
taxation and help the government adjust to the reality of the mass 
exodus of individuals and corporations. Third, as discussed earlier, the 
debt cancellation or forgiveness of large debt portions will reduce the 
overall debt burden significantly. Debt reduction allows 
comprehensible alteration of the overall fiscal policies and adjustment 
to more reliable debt repayment schemes.  
Finally, the revision of PROMESA that I propose will remove 
Section 210. Revising this particular section will expand Puerto Rico’s 
ability to gain access to capital markets to fund projects that do not rely 
on inconsistent revenue streams. Removing Section 210 will allow for 
the full faith and credit of the United States to back whatever debt the 
island needs to be able to rebuild. Allowing the island to rebuild, 
through a well-reasoned and comprehensive debt program, will 
potentially lure back investors, foster a population of talented wage 
earners, and will allow Puerto Ricans the dignity of having their home 
and culture flourish. Furthermore, revision of Section 210 will aid 
Puerto Rico by allowing greater access to grants or low-interest 
financing from the IMF. With these reforms, Puerto Rico can refurbish 
its ailing public works projects, repair or replace damaged 
infrastructure, and, finally, free the island from the drowning weight of 
debt.  
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